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Abstract
The quantum theory of de Broglie and Bohm solves the measurement
problem, but the hypothetical corpuscles play no role in the argument.
The solution finds a more natural home in the Everett interpretation.
“If the quantum theory is to be able to provide a complete description of
everything that can happen in the world . . . it should also be able to describe
the process of observation itself in terms of the wave functions of the observing
apparatus and those of the system under observation. Furthermore, in principle,
it ought to be able to describe the human investigator as he looks at the observing
apparatus and learns what the results of the experiment are, this time in terms
of the wave functions of the various atoms that make up the investigator, as
well as those of the observing apparatus and the system under observation. In
other words, the quantum theory could not be regarded as a complete logical
system unless it contained within it a prescription in principle for how all these
problems were to be dealt with.” D. Bohm [1], p. 583.
1 Introduction
A common attitude amongst those that take the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation
of quantum mechanics1 seriously is that, whatever its oddities and weaknesses,
it solves the biggest conceptual conundrum in the foundations of the theory:
the measurement problem.2 In the present paper, we wish to take issue with
this attitude, or rather its standard construal.
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1On occasions for brevity we will refer to the theory simply as the Bohm theory. (For
useful surveys of the theory—not all in complete agreement!— see Du¨rr et al. [2], Holland [3],
Bohm and Hiley [4] and Cushing [5].) We shall also adopt the convention of referring to the
hypothetical particles—the seat of the definite trajectories that are solutions of the guidance
equation in the theory—as “corpuscles”, the reason being that the word “particle” has wide
usage in all interpretations.
2For a recent expression of this attitude, see Myrvold [6], pp. 19, 21. See also Cushing’s
view as discussed in the last section of the present paper.
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In our view, de Broglie-Bohm theory does have the resources to provide a
coherent solution of the measurement problem, but they do not involve the hy-
pothetical corpuscles whose existence is precisely what distinguishes the theory
from the Everettian picture of quantum reality. The standard view is that it
is the configuration of the corpuscles in the pilot-wave picture that selects the
definite measurement result out of the confusing quantum soup of possibilities
that arises when the initial superposition in the wavefunction description of the
object system goes on to infect the state of the entire measuring set-up. We
want to argue that this reading of the pilot-wave picture is misleading, and that
a proper analysis of the measurement process within the theory should bypass
the corpuscles. As a result, the active role of the corpuscles in the theory is
called into question. Indeed our view is that if there is a justification for the
postulation of the corpuscles, it is not related to the measurement problem per
se.3
This is certainly not the first time the de Broglie-Bohm theory has been
adversely compared with the Everett picture; similar conclusions have been
reached in writings by Deutsch, Zeh and Wallace.4 However, we believe these
treatments can be strengthened. Before we lay out our case, it is useful to revisit
the origins of the theory, or rather David Bohm’s early contributions.
2 Historical considerations
It is well known that the foundational discussion in David Bohm’s text Quan-
tum Theory, first published in 1951, is largely consistent with what Bohm would
call the “usual” interpretation of quantum mechanics—to the extent of contain-
ing an argument against the possibility of hidden variable theories.5 But it
is noteworthy that the detailed, conceptually intricate treatment of the mea-
surement process in Chapter 22 is strikingly at odds with the writings of Niels
Bohr. Unlike Bohr, Bohm demanded in unequivocal terms a quantum theo-
retical treatment of the whole process, including in principle the interaction
with the human investigator. (See the quotation at the start of the present
paper.) Notable also for its farsightedness is the emphasis Bohm placed on the
need for decoherence to occur in the post-measurement state of the joint system
3The motivation behind Bohm’s original 1952 work is discussed below. In the preface to
his 1993 text on de Broglie-Bohm theory, Holland writes
. . . our most basic physical theory [quantum mechanics] contains no account
of the constitution and structure of matter, corresponding to the interacting
particles and fields of classical physics. . . . The aim of the de Broglie-Bohm
theory is not to attempt a return to classical physics, or even particularly to
invent a deterministic theory. Its goal is a complete description of an individual
real situation as it exists independently of acts of observation. ([3], pp. xvii, xviii)
4See Deutsch [7], Zeh [8] and Wallace [9], section 6. Note that our aim is different from
that of Saunders [10], who argued that a solution of the measurement problem in relativistic
quantum field theory based on a pilot-wave picture in the spirit of de Broglie and Bohm is
unsuccessful. Saunders assumed that a solution of the measurement problem based on what
we have called the standard construal of the de Broglie-Bohm theory in first-quantised theory
is straightforward, and that difficulties only arise when the beables are fields rather than
corpuscles. A critique of the standard construal that is closer in spirit to ours, but based
mainly on information-theoretic considerations is found in Stone [11], a hard-hitting reply to
which is found in Maudlin [12]. We return also to the last pair of papers below.
5Bohm [1], section 22.19.
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comprising object and apparatus systems in order to avoid “absurd” results.6
Bohm’s discussion as to why decoherence does in fact occur is not a model
of clarity; several distinct arguments seem to be in play.7 The least satisfactory
of these is based on an appeal to a phase-randomization mechanism associated
with the measurement process, whose justification and very necessity are both
far from obvious. It turns out that Bohm was never entirely happy with this
particular argument8. But the point we want to stress is that the reader of
his book would be forgiven for concluding that with or without it Bohm felt he
had met the challenge of providing the bones of an adequate quantum mechan-
ical treatment of the measurement process, without any recourse to a collapse
mechanism peculiar to this process. In particular, Bohm did not appear to feel
compelled to raise the delicate question as to why the element of the decohered
post-interaction wavefunction of the joint system that corresponds to the actual
measurement outcome should be favored over the others.9
Let’s now move on to Bohm’s subsequent famous double 1952 paper, in
which he independently discovered and developed the essential features of Louis
de Broglie’s pilot wave theory of the late twenties. This work patently demon-
strated the weakness of Bohm’s earlier no-hidden-variables argument, but what
if anything was new in the papers in relation to the measurement process?
Much of paper II is concerned with measurement, and builds on the 1951
discussion. It has an explicit treatment—using again a model of impulsive in-
teraction between the microscopic object system and the apparatus—within
the Bohm scheme of dynamics for the many-body problem developed in paper
I. Bohm states explicitly that the definite coordinate associated with the ‘ap-
paratus variable’ (the hidden variable of the apparatus) will enter one of the
non-overlapping wavepackets associated with the final “ψ-field” of the joint sys-
tem. The wavepacket in question determines, according to Bohm, the outcome
of the measurement. This is a crucial claim—which we shall call the Result
Assumption— and we will return to it. We first have to determine what the
main point of the discussion of measurement in paper II was.
It is a remarkable and wholly praiseworthy feature of the “special assump-
tions” defining Bohm’s interpretation, and given in section 4 of paper I, that
they do not contain the word “measurement”, and nor does their extension in
6ibid section 22.11; see also the discussion in section 22.8.
7See again ibid sections 22.8, 22.11
8Private communication with Basil Hiley.
9The closest Bohm comes in his book to addressing the heart of the measurement problem
as it is now standardly understood is in section 22.10. Here he argues that despite the joint
system being in a pure entangled post-measurement state, for predictive purposes the object
subsystem can be described by a ”statistical ensemble of separate wavefunctions” (Bohm did
not like the word “mixture”!; p. 604), and since these individual wavefunctions correspond to
near-eigenstates of the observable being measured, the process of observation involves nothing
more than a gain in information:
When the observer looks at the apparatus, he then discovers in which state
the system actually is, by finding out in which of the . . . possible [correlated]
classically distinguishable states the observing apparatus is. . . . The sudden
replacement of the statistical ensemble of wavefunctions by a single wavefunction
represents absolutely no change in the [object system] state . . ., but is analogous
to the sudden changes in classical probability functions which accompany an
improvement in the observer’s information. (pp. 603-604)
This kind of argument has often been repeated, but it is far from convincing; one familiar way
of putting the problem is that Bohm overlooks the distinction between proper and improper
mixtures.
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section 6 to the many-body problem. But eventually measurements must come
into the picture and Bohm wrote in the Introduction to paper II:
In this paper, we shall apply the interpretation of the quantum the-
ory suggested in Paper I to the development of a theory of mea-
surements in order to show that as long as one makes the special
assumptions indicated above, one is led to the same predictions for
all measurements as are obtained from the usual interpretation.10
The aim, then, was with the help also of the Result Assumption, to match the
“usual” interpretation, and not, it would seem, to surpass it. Let us dwell on
this point.
Both 1952 papers make frequent reference to the possibility of altering the
“special assumptions” so as to produce a theory with truly novel predictions.
But the treatment of the measurement process in paper II does not exploit these
possibilities, and anyway this is not the feature of Bohm’s argument that we
wish to underline. Consider rather how Bohm explains that an effective collapse
of the ψ-field (to the packet into which the apparatus coordinate has entered)
can be understood from the point of view of post-measurement predictions.
Nowhere in this discussion is it explicitly emphasised that since in the theory
the true ψ-field dynamics of measurement is unitary, the theory is preferable
to any interpretation which contains both unitary and collapse dynamics but
fails to explain how they co-exist. Just such a failure is commonly attributed
to the Copenhagen interpretation, but as we have seen above in 1951 Bohm
appeared to think that a satisfactory account of measurement was already pos-
sible within the usual interpretation, or at least his version of it. At any rate, no
hint of superiority is apparent in Bohm’s 1952 treatment of the measurement
process.11 Nor is the above Result Assumption in itself touted as a solution
to any sort of problem associated with interpreting the final incoherently su-
perposed ψ-field emerging from the measurement interaction. The assumption
appears to be simply an element of a new measurement theory the articulation
of which is designed simply to establish predictive compatibility with the usual
interpretation.
Other considerations can be brought to bear on the question as to whether in
1952 Bohm thought that his hidden variable theory solved a conceptual problem
related to measurement that the usual interpretation had thrown up. First,
consider Jeffrey Bub’s 1997 recollections of his experiences as a graduate student
of Bohm in the 1960s. Bub remembers discovering the measurement problem
not in discussions with Bohm but through independent reading (particularly of
the work of Henry Margenau).12 What surely is even more striking is Bub’s
recollection that Bohm subsequently suggested to him, in an attempt to solve
the measurement problem, an examination of the work of Siegel and Weiner that
had appeared in a series of papers in the 1950s. This suggestion was to lead
to the 1966 Bohm-Bub hidden variable theory, which explicitly addressed the
measurement problem in a fashion that is radically distinct from the “solution”
10Bohm [13], paper II.
11Of course, Bohm clearly saw his theory as refuting the implication of the usual interpre-
tation “that we must renounce the possibility of describing an individual system in terms of
a single precisely defined conceptual model” (Paper II, section 10). We return to this point
shortly.
12Bub [14], p. xii.
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that is now widely associated with the pilot-wave theory of 1952. For some
years after 1966 Bohm continued to work on a model inspired by the collapse
mechanism of the Bohm-Bub theory.13
Bohm’s own early comments on his 1952 theory, highlighted in Myrvold’s
recent study14 of the early response to the theory on the part of the physics
community, are also worth mentioning. These comments are noteworthy for
their clarification of the motivation behind the theory, and as Myrvold notes,
for their emphasis on the provisional nature of his theory. In replying in 1962
to Heisenberg’s 1958 critique, Bohm claimed that Heisenberg may have failed
to appreciate that
· · ·the only purpose of this phase of the work was to show that an
alternative to the Copenhagen interpretation is at least logically pos-
sible.15
In the same year he wrote
· · ·the existence of even a single consistent theory of this kind showed
that whatever arguments one might continue to use against hidden
variables, one could no longer use the argument that they are incon-
ceivable.16
Bohm admitted that his theory “was not satisfactory for general physical rea-
sons”17, but saw it as “a starting point”, the initial step in a process that would
eventually lead to a hidden variable theory “more plausible physically and el-
egant mathematically”.18 This diffidence in Bohm’s stance to his own 1952
theory is to some extent evident as late as 1993, in his book with Basil Hiley,
The Undivided Universe19. What change there was in his thinking between
1952 and 1993 has significantly to do with the theory of measurement. Bohm
came to believe that there is a measurement problem in the usual interpreta-
tion, probably under the influence of Bub in the sixties, and from at least 1984
onwards, he and Hiley argued that it finds a solution in the 1952 theory.20
3 Bohm’s Result Assumption
It is useful to consider of the precise wording of this assumption.
Now, the packet entered by the apparatus [hidden] variable . . . de-
termines the actual result of the measurement, which the observer
will obtain when he looks at the apparatus.21
13See ibid, p. xii.
14Myrvold [6], §3.
15Bohm [15], p.270.
16Bohm [16], p. 360; [17], p. 81.
17Bohm [15], p.270.
18Bohm [16], p. 360; [17], p. 81.
19Bohm and Hiley [4], p. 5. Basil Hiley has told us in private communication that Bohm
never mentioned his 1952 papers during the first eight or so years of their colloboration in
the Department of Physics at Birkbeck College, London. An earlier collaborator of Bohm’s
at Birkbeck, Chris Philippidis, has likewise told us that he only discovered the existence of
the 1952 hidden variable theory while at an overseas conference several years after the start
of their colloboration.
20Bohm and Hiley [18]; Bohm and Hiley [4], Chapter 6, particularly §6.7.
21Bohm [13], part II, section 2.
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Suppose we accept that it is the entered wavepacket that determines the
outcome of the measurement. Is it trivial that the observer will confirm this
result when he or she “looks at the apparatus”? No, though one reason for the
nontriviality of the issue has only become clear relatively recently. The striking
discovery in 1992 of the possibility (in principle) of “fooling” a detector in de
Broglie-Bohm theory22 should warn us that it cannot be a mere definitional
matter within the theory that the perceived measurement result corresponds
to the “outcome” selected by the hidden corpuscles. There is much more that
needs to be said about this issue, but it is not our central concern.23
Our concern rather is with the fact that for Bohm it is the entered wave
packet that determines the outcome; the role of the hidden variable, or apparatus
corpuscle, is merely to pick or select that packet from amongst the other non-
overlapping packets in the configuration space associated with the final state of
the joint object-apparatus system. How literally Bohm meant this is perhaps
open to debate24, but his wording does invite us to re-examine the apparently
innocuous case of predictable outcomes, i.e. measurement on a system in an
eigenstate of the observable being measured.
In this case only a single ‘localised’ wavepacket exists in the configuration
space at the end of the measurement process—the wavepacket correlated with
the initial eigenvector of the observable being measured which happens to be the
initial state of the object system. The crucial question we wish to raise is this.
Does this wavepacket, in and of itself, account for the result of the measurement,
or does a definite measurement outcome require, even in this case of complete
predictability, the presence of the hidden variables within it?
Most discussions of the measurement problem in quantum mechanics take
it for granted that no difficulties arise in this case of the predictable outcome—
that the problem only rears its head in the more interesting and more general
case of unpredictability, when the intial state of the object system is some linear
combination of eigenvectors of the relevant observable. But if analysis of the
predictable case is successful without appeal to hidden variables, then Bohm’s
Result Assumption in the general case is problematic. In the general case,
each of the non-overlapping packets in the final joint-system configuration space
wavefunction has the same credentials for representing a definite measurement
outcome as the single packet does in the predictable case. The problem, if it
is one, is that there is more than one of them. But the fact that only one
of them carries the de Broglie-Bohm corpuscles does nothing to remove these
credentials from the others. Adding the corpuscles to the picture does not
interfere destructively with the empty packets. The Result Assumption appears
to be inconsistent with the treatment of the predictable case, or at least to
22See Englert et al. [19], Dewdney et al. [20], Brown et al. [21] and Hiley et al. [22].
23We note however that the mentioned possibility of fooling detectors casts doubt on the
claim by Maudlin [12] p. 483, that the so-called effective (post-measurement) wavefunction of
the object system is defined (in part) by the positions of the corpuscles associated with the
apparatus.
24Taken literally, Bohm’s position in 1952 is not strictly the same as that expressed in
Bohm and Hiley [4], as we shall see below. It my also be worth pointing out that the notion
of corpuscles ‘pointing’ to or selecting wavepackets is not an entirely sharp one. In the case of
a single, more or less localized wavepacket in the configuration space, there is a small chance
the corpuscles’ configuration is represented by a point well outside the bulk of the packet.
It can be said to ‘point’ to the packet because trivially there is no other, but in the case of
a linear combination of near-non-overlapping packets, there must be a very small chance of
ambiguous pointing.
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override it in some mysterious way.
It seems to us that the only way to avoid this conundrum in the de Broglie-
Bohm theory is to adopt the position that in the predictable case deriving
the single localised wavepacket is not sufficient to account for the outcome of
the measurement. Just such a position has been defended by Holland. In
his monumental text The Quantum Theory of Motion, he writes in relation to
the measurement problems and the Schro¨dinger cat paradox that even if some
stochastic, non-unitary collapse occurs
· · · the definite state so obtained will still only be a wavefunction
that in itself exhibits no feature that may be identified with the
reality of a definite pointer position, or the centre of mass of a cat.25
This point is reinforced in Holland’s detailed discussion of the dynamics of the
measurement process, where he distinguishes two aspects of the coupling of the
object system and apparatus: what it takes to get a definite outcome and what
it takes to ensure that this outcome carries information about the object system.
The definiteness of the final outcome is a property of the definite-
ness of the [apparatus] pointer location [defined by the configuration
of apparatus corpuscles] under all circumstances (i.e. whatever the
quantum state). This is the crucial point, and not that Ψ is com-
posed of a set of disjoint packets. The latter is simply a necessary
condition that allows us to ascertain from the always well-defined
pointer reading unambiguous information on an object property, and
is not itself the condition for definiteness.26
Concluding his analysis of the measurement process, Holland writes
It is the assumption of a corpuscle which transforms quantum me-
chanics into a theory having substance and form. The pure wave
dynamics described by Schro¨dinger’s equation does not yield any ac-
count of which result is actually realized in an individual measure-
ment operation. The wavefunction collapse hypothesis only gains
physical content if actual coordinates for the collapsed system are
posited. Since the point at which these are introduced in the chain
of connected physical systems is arbitrary, the only consistent as-
sumption is that they are well defined all along.27
So it is only by adopting Holland’s position that the Result Assumption makes
sense in the de Broglie-Bohm theory. However, we resist Holland’s position.
Quantum mechanics, in our view, has both substance and form before the in-
troduction of hidden corpuscles. In fact, we believe the case has already been
made elsewhere, the rest of this paper being an attempt to summarise the bones
of the argument and to add a bit more new flesh to it. To this end, the case of
the single-outcome, predictable measurement will be repeatedly exploited.
25Holland [3], p. 334.
26ibid, p. 347
27ibid, p. 350
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4 The main argument
Comparison of the de Broglie-Bohm theory with the Everett interpretation will
be the starting point of our argument. For from the perspective of mathematical
physics it seems (at least at first sight) to be rather odd to claim that the
former is ontologically more frugal than the latter. The mathematical formalism
of the Bohm theory, after all, consists of two elements: the quantum state
vector, or wave function, evolving according to the Schro¨dinger equation, and
the corpuscles, represented by a point in configuration space. The Everett
interpretation requires only the first of these two elements — so why is it not
Bohm’s theory, rather than Everett’s, which contains excess ontology?
Until perhaps the late 1980s, Bohmians had a ready answer to this question.
The “many worlds” talk used in discussions of Everett (they might say) is mere
talk unless the formalism is supplemented by some additional mathematical
structure. If such supplementation is attempted (for instance, by Deutsch’s [23]
explicit specification of the “worlds”, or by Albert and Loewer’s [24] addition
of “minds” whose trajectories were determined by the state vector28) then the
ontological comparison is indeed in Bohm’s favour: in place of a single N -tuple
of corpuscles the Everett interpretation has a vast collection of such N -tuples,
representing countless worlds, or countless minds. Why not then abandon all
but one, and trim a bloated ontology?
However, in recent years Everett’s defenders29 have been less willing to con-
cede the necessity of supplementing the wave-function with any additional struc-
ture. Instead, they have increasingly defended the view that the “worlds” are
in some sense emergent from the bare wave-function, in rather the same way
that everyday objects in our macroscopic world (cats, say; or tables) emerge
from the microphysics without having to be explicitly added to the formalism.
The main technical development behind this shift has been decoherence theory,
which provides a robustly-defined (if not quite perfectly defined) choice of pre-
ferred basis with which to defined the worlds. “Worlds” in this sense can be seen
as decoherence-defined components of the wave-function, effectively though not
quite perfectly immune from interference with other such components.
From this modern perspective, the ontological situation shifts. The Ev-
erettian ontology is now robustly monistic — the wave-function constitutes the
whole of reality — and it is the Bohm theory which is ontologically excessive.
This criticism is only sharpened by the recognition that decoherence — cen-
tral to the modern view of Everett — is also essential in the Bohmian picture.
Although the Bohmian corpuscle picks out by fiat a preferred basis (position),
the de Broglie-Bohm theory still has to tell some story about the measurement-
induced effective collapse of the wave function. Bohm recognised this in 1952;
from a modern perspective, we recognise this as the requirement that (1) deco-
herence occurs, and (2) the preferred basis which it picks out is (approximately)
the position basis.
From this viewpoint, the corpuscle’s role is minimal indeed: it is in danger
of being relegated to the role of a mere epiphenomenal ‘pointer’, irrelevantly
picking out one of the many branches defined by decoherence, while the real
story — dynamically and ontologically — is being told by the unfolding evolu-
28For criticisms of these two views, see respectively Foster and Brown [25] and Lock-
wood [26].
29See, e.g. , Saunders [27], Wallace [28, 9], or Vaidman [29].
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tion of those branches. The “empty wave packets” in the configuration space
which the corpuscles do not point at are none the worse for its absence: they
still contain cells, dust motes, cats, people, wars and the like. The point has
been stated clearly by Zeh:
It is usually overlooked that Bohm’s theory contains the same “many
worlds” of dynamically separate branches as the Everett interpreta-
tion (now regarded as “empty” wave components), since it is based
on precisely the same . . . global wave function . . .30
Deutsch has expressed the point more acerbically:
[P]ilot-wave theories are parallel-universe theories in a state of chronic
denial.31
5 Decoherence
How can the de Broglie-Bohm theory be defended against this sort of attack?
In this section and the next two, we will explore what we see as the range of
defences available and argue that none succeeds.
Perhaps the most obvious — and the most principled — defence is to attack
the coherence of the Everettian account on its own terms: if (notwithstanding
decoherence) we cannot regard worlds as emergent from the wavefunction, then
the corpuscle retains its role as the definer of those worlds and the wavefunction
remains simply an auxiliary field — albeit an astonishingly complicated one.
Such an attack might be mounted in one of three ways. The first is purely
technical: it might be that decoherence does not in fact succeed in producing a
preferred basis (and specifically a quasi-classical basis) in realistic models. This
is a long shot, however, given the impressive success of the decoherence program
for simpler (but increasingly complicated) models; as mentioned above, it also
threatens to undermine the Bohm theory, which is also highly dependent on
decoherence.32
The second and third attacks are more philosophical in nature. The second
is as follows: granted that decoherence picks out a quasi-classical basis as pre-
ferred, what is to say that it does not also pick out a multitude of other bases
— very alien with respect to the bases with which we ordinarily work, perhaps,
but just as ‘preferred’ from the decoherence viewpoint. Such a discovery would
seem to undermine the objectivity of Everettian branching, leaving room for the
Bohmian corpuscle to restore that objectivity.
Saunders [27] offers an anthropic response to this attack. Suppose that
there were several such decompositions, each supporting information-processing
systems. Then the fact that we observe one rather than another is a fact of
purely local significance: we happen to be information-processing systems in
one set of decoherent histories rather than another.
30Zeh [8]. In this paper, Zeh states on the basis of private correspondence with him in
1981 that “John Bell (who rejected Everett’s interpretation for being “extravagant”), seems
to have realized this equivalence before he began to favor spontaneous localization (such as
GRW) over Bohm’s theory . . .”.
31Deutsch [7].
32See Bohm and Hiley [4], section 6.1.
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There is perhaps a more robust response available to the Everettian here.
Granted that we cannot rule out the possibility that there might be alternative
decompositions, and that this would radically affect the viability of the Everett
interpretation — well, right now we have no reason at all to suppose that there
actually are such decompositions. Analogously, logically we can’t absolutely
rule out the possibility that there’s a completely different way of construing the
meaning of all English words, such that they mostly mean completely different
things but such that speakers of English still (mostly) make true and relevant
utterances. Such a discovery would radically transform linguistics and philos-
ophy, but we don’t have any reason to think it will actually happen, and we
have much reason to suppose that it will not. To discover one sort of higher-
level structure in microphysics (be it the microphysics of sound-waves or the
micro-physics of the wave-function) is pretty remarkable; to discover several
incompatible structures in the same bit of microphysics would verge on the
miraculous.33
The third attack involves the approximate nature of the decoherence-preferred
basis. Reality (it says) should not be an approximate, fuzzy thing: a criterion
for macroscopic definiteness should be sharp and well-defined. This has been
popular with a number of physicists, including Bell [31], Kent [33] and as we
have seen, Holland.
However, there seems no obvious basis for such a requirement.34 In general,
macroscopic objects are not precisely defined in microphysical terms: rather,
they emerge from the microphysics as robust structures or patterns as, for ex-
ample, Dennett [34] has argued — thus, a cat is a higher-level structure in a
lower-level ontology of cells, and those cells are in turn structures in a lower-
level ontology of atoms and molecules. It is in the nature of such structures to
be ‘noisy’ — that is, very robust but not perfectly so. This view of higher-level
ontology has been called a ‘functionalist view’ by analogy with (and as a gener-
alisation of) the related view in philosophy of mind to which we return in section
7. It is fair to point out that it has come under some criticism in recent years
from metaphysicians35, but it is also fair to describe it as virtually a consensus
among philosophers, and philosophically inclined workers, in cognitive science
and the philosophy of the special sciences.36
For these reasons we find the attacks on the coherence of the Everettian
ontology unpersuasive, committed as they are either to conflict with mainstream
views in physics and in general philosophy.
6 Degrees of Reality?
If Bohmians cannot deny that the ‘empty waves’ contain real macroscopic ob-
jects on grounds of structure, they may be able to do so from a more metaphysi-
cal perspective. There are two possible ways that they might do so: firstly, they
might deny that the wave-function is the ‘sort of stuff’ from which cats, tables
33See Dennett [30], pp. 344–348, for more on these “cryptographic constraints” on the
indeterminacy of translation.
34See Wallace [9].
35In particular Jaegwon Kim; see for instance [35].
36For a recent review of the debate, see Ross and Spurrett [36], and the comments on their
paper in a forthcoming issue of Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
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and physicists can be made; alternatively, they might take the bolder step of
denying the reality of the wave-function altogether.
Something like the first position is defended in, say, Bohm and Hiley’s book
The Undivided Universe:
. . . it could be felt that the empty packets, which also satisfy
Schro¨dinger’s equation, constitute a vast mass of ‘bits of reality’
that are, as it were, ‘floating around’ interpenetrating that part of
reality which corresponds to the occupied packets.
In our interpretation, however, we do not assume that the ba-
sic reality is thus described primarily by the wavefunction. Rather
. . . we begin with the assumption that there are particles follow-
ing definite trajectories. . . . We then assume that the wavefunction,
ψ, describes a qualitatively new kind of quantum field which deter-
mines the guidance conditions and the quantum potential acting on
the particle. We are not denying the reality of this field, but we
are saying that its significance is relatively subtle in the sense that
it contains active information that ’guides’ the particle in its self-
movement under its own energy. . . . So ultimately all manifestations
of the quantum fields are through the particles.37
The electromagnetic field is also only detectable by way of its action on
‘matter’. (Indeed, since Bell, it has been popular to regard the wave function
in the Bohm theory as a physical field akin to the electromagnetic field.) But
the reason we regard the electromagnetic field as immaterial, in so far as we do,
is that being linear it is not rich enough alone to support the sorts of complex
structures that give rise to macroscopic objects. Not long ago it was fashionable
to speculate about large-scale structures being built out of (nonlinear) pure
geometry; it is still fashionable to speculate that nonlinearities in quantum
chromodynamics could give rise to objects built purely out of the gluon field.
If we encountered objects like these, we would not deem them “immaterial”
simply because they were made out of the wrong sort of field.38 And let us
not forget that the pure electromagnetic field is capable on its own of bending
space-time—and that there is every reason to think that the wavefunction is
too.
We are hard-pressed then to see why the wavefunction should be regarded
as a second-class citizen in the reality stakes. A slightly different tack is taken
by Bohm and Hiley in their discussion of the Schro¨dinger cat paradox, which
attempts to address the “ambiguity of the state of being” of the cat when it finds
itself entangled with the killing machine, the joint system having been brought
in the familiar way into a superposition of the dead and alive possibilities.
To define the actual state of being of the cat, we have to consider
in addition the particles that constitute it. It is evident that when
the cat is alive, many of these particles will be in quite different
places and will move quite differently than they would if the cat
were dead.
37Bohm and Hiley [4], pp. 104-5.
38In any case, in quantum field theory the matter/field distinction breaks down to a sub-
stantial degree. The observed mass of any ‘material’ particle owes as much to its cloud of
virtual field particles as it does to its material components.
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. . . in our interpretation that state of being also depends on
the positions of the particles that constitute [the cat] . . . and it is
this which enables us to treat this situation non-paradoxically as in
essence a simple case of pairs of alternative and mutually exclusive
states.39
We cannot but agree that the cat-corpuscles will find themselves in one and
only one element of the superposition, and that their configuration and motion
will depend on which, but does this mean that the “state of being” of the cat
is singular in the sense Bohm and Hiley are after?
Consider the element in the superposition that does not contain the corpuscles—
the ‘empty’ wavepacket in the configuration space of the joint system. Does it
not describe (amongst other things) a cat that is either dead or alive? Yes, most
of us would say, if the cat had actually been prepared exclusively in the cat-state
that is contained in (better: is a factor state of) that element. Recalling the
discussion in section 3 above of the predictable single-outcome measurement,
and the arguments of the previous section, is it not more natural to say that
the superposition describes both a dead and an alive cat (each correlated with
distinct states of the environment) with one of these possibilities replete with
corpuscles? It is hard to see how the corpuscles annul the reality of the other
possibility; indeed they cannot. To argue that the “state of being” of the cat
depends “in addition” or “also” on the corpuscles is to admit that the wave-
function plays some role in the matter, but not one consistent with the common
interpretation of the predictable, single outcome measurement scenario.
It is interesting that at times Bohmians slide into a mode of talking about
systems as if they were just made out of corpuscles40, but this is only coherent
if the radical position is adopted that the wavefunction is simply not real at
all, that it is a piece of mathematical machinery in the quantum mechanical
algorithm for the motion of corpuscles. Yet ‘reality’ is not some property which
we can grant or withhold in an arbitrary way from the components of our
mathematical formalism. The wave-function evolves; it dynamically influences
the corpuscles; in interference experiments its existence is explanatorily central
to the observed phenomena. On what grounds could we just dismiss it as a
mathematical fiction?
Again there is a bad analogy to resist here. From the corpuscles’ perspec-
tive, the wave-function is just a (time-dependent) function on their configuration
space, telling them how to behave; it superficially appears similar to the New-
tonian or Coulomb potential field, which is again a function on configuration
space. No-one was tempted to reify the Newtonian potential; why, then, reify
the wave-function?
Because the wave-function is a very different sort of entity. It is contingent
(equivalently, it has dynamical degrees of freedom independent of the corpus-
cles); it evolves over time; it is structurally overwhelmingly more complex (the
Newtonian potential can be written in closed form in a line; there is not the
slightest possibility of writing a closed form for the wave-function of the Uni-
verse.) Historically, it was exactly when the gravitational and electric fields
began to be attributed independent dynamics and degrees of freedom that they
39ibid. pp. 126–7.
40See for example, Bohm and Hiley [4] in the final paragraph of section 6.7, or the quotation
from Maudlin [12] given in the next section of the present paper.
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were reified: the Coulomb or Newtonian ‘fields’ may be convenient mathematical
fictions, but the Maxwell field and the dynamical spacetime metric are almost
universally accepted as part of the ontology of modern physics.
We don’t pretend to offer a systematic theory of which mathematical entities
in physical theories should be reified. But we do claim that the decision is not
to be made by fiat, and that some combination of contingency, complexity and
time evolution seems to be a requirement.41
To illustrate further why denying reality to the wave-function by fiat would
go against basic principles of physics, consider Wheeler and Feynman’s heroic
attempt to eliminate the electromagnetic field. It is generally recognised that
they failed (not least because of the advent of quantum electrodynamics) but
that they approached the problem in an appropriate way: find a way of rewriting
the dynamical equations such that the electromagnetic field entirely disappears,
and make whatever hypotheses about the distant past we require in order to
justify the rewrite. How much easier — but how much more unprincipled — it
would have been for them simply to declare that the electromagnetic field does
not exist, but that matter behaves as if it did exist.
This analogy does suggest one possible strategy for Bohmians, however:
rather than just denying the reality of the wave-function, find a principled way
to eliminate it from the theory and recover it as an effective, phenomenological
object (just as Wheeler and Feynman attempted to do for the electromagnetic
field). Such a strategy has been advocated by Goldstein and co-workers [38, 39],
taking its motivation from quantum cosmology. They suppose that the wave-
function of the Universe (regarded as the solution of some Wheeler-de Witt-type
equation) may turn out to be both unique and time-independent, and that this
will make it appropriate to regard it more as a physical law than as a physical
object.
Two comments should be made about this research program.
Firstly, it is a research programme. Bohmian quantum cosmology, as with
all other proposals for quantum cosmology, is at present purely speculative,
beset with technical and conceptual problems, and quite disconnected from ex-
periment. (Golstein and Teufel [39] give a sympathetic review of its current
status.) As such, the existence right now of a Bohmian solution of the mea-
surement problem based on ideas from quantum cosmology is as implausible
as the notion that Penrose’s speculative suggestions about gravitation-induced
collapse mean that the measurement problem is now solved.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, even given a technically satisfac-
tory Bohmian cosmology, it is by no means clear that we should not reify that
cosmology’s wavefunction. We identified earlier three features of the wavefunc-
tion which distinguish it from the Newtonian potential: it is dynamical; it is
contingent; and it is extremely richly structured. Of these, it is at best very
unclear that any of them fail in a cosmological context. As far as dynamics are
concerned, though the cosmological wavefunction is usually taken to be time-
independent, the notion of time is so controversial in quantum cosmology that
we would be reluctant to jump too quickly from this time-independence to any
claim about dynamics. As for contingency, it is at most an article of faith with
41Those who sympathise with Leibniz’ claim—fully endorsed by Einstein—that the essence
of a real thing is its ability to act and be acted upon, may be interested in a defence of
the reality of the wavefunction based on the action-reaction principle found in Anandan and
Brown [37].
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some physicists that the Wheeler-de Witt equation has a unique solution. And
as for complexity (in our view perhaps the most important criterion) the struc-
ture encoded in the cosmological wavefunction will if anything be richer than
that encoded in the nonrelativistic wavefunction.
7 Consciousness
If it correct that the the de Broglie-Bohm theory essentially involves a dualist
ontology, with corpuscle and wavefunction on an equal footing, there is nonethe-
less a fundamental asymmetry in the duality. As Bell stressed, “It is . . . from
the xs [the coordinates of the corpuscles], rather than the ψ, that in this theory
we suppose ‘observables’ to be constructed”.42 Could this asymmetry be the
basis of another strategy for the Bohmians?
Observables in the context of Bell’s remark are defined relative to sentient
observers, and it is a tenet of the de Broglie-Bohm picture that such observers
are aware of corpuscles in a way that fails to hold for wave functions. Of course,
there is an obvious sense in which the corpuscles are also ‘hidden’, and Du¨rr
et al. emphasized in 1992 that the only time we can have sure knowledge of
the configuration of corpuscles is “when we ourselves are part of the system”.43
But how exactly is this supposed to work? Stone correctly pointed out in 1994
that this claim certainly fails if our knowledge is based on measurements which
one part of our brain makes on another.44 But perhaps what Du¨rr et al. had
in mind was closer to Maudlin’s 1995 position.
If we want to know what happened to the measuring device (e.g.,
which way the pointer went), we look at it, thereby correlating po-
sitions of particles in our brains with the pointer position. If getting
the state of our brain correlated with the previously unknown exter-
nal conditions is not getting information about the world, nothing
is.45
This last sentence is unimpeachable, and it applies as much to the Everett as
to the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation. But Maudlin seems to be taking it for
granted that our conscious perceptions supervene directly and exclusively on
the configuration of (some subset) of the corpuscles associated with our brain.
If this is so, it is true we gain information by way of such correlations between
corpuscles in and outside of our craniums. But the question is, why believe this
theory of psycho-physical parallelism?
Recall Bohm’s 1951 exortation to allow inclusion of the human investigator
into the quantum-mechanically treatable measurement chain, and consider once
again its significance in the case of the predictable measurement raised above in
section 3. Few would argue that in the absence of de Broglie-Bohm corpuscles
quantum mechanics is incapable in principle of accounting for the predictable
sensation on the part of the sentient observer. Why shouldn’t consciousness
supervene as much on wavefunctions as on corpuscles?—a possibility that was
clearly entertained by Bohm in 1951. But if one allows for this possibility, the
42Bell [31], p. 128.
43Du¨rr et al. [2].
44Stone [11].
45Maudlin [12], p. 483.
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floodgates into the Everettian multiplicity of autonomous, definite perceived
outcomes are opened.46 To restrict supervenience of consciousness to de Broglie-
Bohm corpuscles in the brain does succeed in restricting conscious goings-on to
one and only one branch of the Everett multiverse but it seems unwarranted and
bizarre. The strategy seems unmotivated except by a desire purely to reduce the
number of conscious observers in the universe, and it is at best unclear whether
this is a reasonable application of Occam’s Razor.47 We do not in general
choose between competing evolutionary theories on the grounds of minimising
the number of predicted alien civilisations, nor between competing theories of
human prehistory on the grounds of minimising the number of homo sapiens
who have walked the earth. And the price that is paid is the existence of a vast
number of zombies or mindless hulks (you choose your nomenclature) associated
with the empty waves that act precisely as if they were conscious but are not.
It is worth bearing in mind too that significant coarse-graining must take
place in the process of our awareness of the corpuscles. Considerable variation
in the precise configuration of the corpuscles in our brain must be unobservable.
How much? Not even the effective wave function of our brain can be directly
known precisely; even Everettians must admit there is a many-one relationship
between wave functions of the brain and conscious sensations. But it seems
to be the case that the effective wave function of the brain represents a strict
lower bound on the course-graining of consciousness. A violation of the no-
signalling theorem is possible in principle were we to ‘know’ the configuration
of corpuscles in our brain with a greater level of accuracy than that defined by
the wave function. To our knowledge this important point was first made by
Valentini in 1992.48 He wrote further:
This might seem to argue in favour of abandoning the hidder-variable
altogether, and retaining only the wavefunction, thereby leading to
the many-worlds theory. But the situation is really the same here as
in classical mechanics: An experimenter built from classical atoms
has a reality which rests on the precise configuration φ of all his
atoms, and yet his functioning is completely insensitive to φ, beyond
a certain level of accuracy . . .49
. It is not clear to us that the analogy with classical mechanics is accurate,
though. An experimenter “built from classical atoms” has an approximate con-
figuration which is logically supervenient on his exact configuration: it doesn’t
make sense to suppose one specified without the other. By contrast, in the
de Broglie-Bohm theory the “approximate configuration” defined by the wave-
packet is a completely distinct entity from the “exact configuration” defined by
the corpuscles, and we can imagine either existing independently of the other.
46As we saw in section 3, even in his hidden variables paper II of 1952, Bohm seems
to associate the wavepacket chosen by the corpuscles as the representing outcome of the
measurement—the role of the corpuscles merely being to point to it. But if this wavepacket
can support consciousness, it is mysterious why empty ones cannot.
47It is noteworthy that the active role of the corpuscles in the de Broglie-Bohm theory is
merely to act on each other, not back on the wavefunction. So it is striking that such passive
entities are purportedly capable of grounding consciousness experience. C.f. Stone [11] and
independently Brown [40].
48Valentini [41], p. 30.
49ibid, pp. 30–31.
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In any case, Valentini’s point reminds us of an important—but extremely
questionable—assumption about the nature of consciousnes which our discus-
sion thus far has been making: namely, the assumption that consciousness is
some sort of bare physical property (like, say, charge) whose connection with
physical matter can simply be posited rather as we posit other basic physical
laws. To be sure, this approach to consciousness is not uncommon in the founda-
tions of physics: arguably it was first made explicit in von Neumann’s doctrine
of psycho-physical parallelism, which suggests that the link between conscious
experience and the physical world is just one more thing to be specified by any
interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Such an approach, however, makes consciousness completely divorced from
any assumptions rooted in the study of the brain. In neuroscience, in cogni-
tive science, in AI, and in psychology, it is almost universally assumed that
consciousness is some emergent property of physical matter, the emergence of
which is to be understood “functionally” — that is, in terms of how that phys-
ical matter moves and interacts. If this were not the case, then — given the
causal closure of the physical world — consciousness could have no empirical
consequences, and would be opaque to third-person scientific study.50 If on the
other hand the functionalist assumption is correct, for consciousness to super-
vene on the corpuscles but not the wavepackets, the corpuscles must have some
functional property that the wave packets don’t share. But as we have just seen,
the functional behaviour of the corpuscles is identical to that of the wavepacket
in which they reside.
This is not to say that Bohmians who want to reject the functionalist as-
sumption for consciousness would be entirely without allies. Among scientists,
while neuroscientists, psychologists et al. are hostile to the approach, a few
physicists have been substantially more sympathetic.51 Among philosophers,
some eminent voices (such as Searle [45] and Chalmers [46], and in the context
of quantum mechanics, Lockwood [26]) have rejected the functionalist approach
and held out for an alternative, first-person-centred, science of the mind. But
it should be recognised that these are distinctly unorthodox opinions in both
50See [42] for further development of this point.
51One commentator who effectively rejects the functionalist approach to consciousness, by
claiming that the Everett picture is simply opaque as to what perceptions should be like, is
Penrose; see his [43] p. 296 and [44] p. 312. How, Penrose asks, do we rule out the emergence
of a conscious view of the world that corresponds to bases other than the decoherence basis
and relative to which it seems that all hell breaks loose, or at least macroscopic things like
elephants seem to smear out over space? Yet we note that the principle of democracy of
orthogonal bases applies just as much to the single-outcome predictable case. When we can
predict with certainty that an observer will be aware of a certain outcome, it seems we do not
get into a sweat over the fact that the usual wavefunction describing the predicted state of
affairs (including the mental state of the observer) could also be written as a linear combination
of bizarre-looking states belonging to an arbitrary basis in the Hilbert space associated with
the joint system. It is noteworthy that Penrose uses precisely the single-outcome measurement
to argue for the reality of the wave function ([44], p. 315.), and it would seem odd were he not
to see the relation in this case between the state vector and what we are supposed actually to
observe. (Certainly Penrose, unlike Holland, does not mention any need to introduce further
structure into quantum mechanics to this end; indeed to do so would be incompatible with
the spirit of Penrose’s own gravitationally-induced collapse model.) But if this relation is
transparent in the predictable case, as it seems to be, then its alleged opaqueness in the
general case is not a foregone conclusion. To repeat the point made in section 3, each element
of the relevant decoherence basis has the same credentials to represent a definite, familiar
conscious state on the part of the observer as the single element does in the predictable case.
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cases.
8 Conclusions
James Cushing was an eloquent and indefatigable promoter of the de Broglie-
Bohm theory. In an article he published in 1996 entitled “What Measurement
Problem?”, Cushing wrote the following.
One of the most beautiful aspects of Bohm’s [[13], Paper II] . . . is
his treatment of the measurement problem (which becomes a non-
problem). In his theory, measurement is a dynamical and essentially
a many-body process. There is no collapse of the wavefunction and,
hence, no measurement problem. The basic idea is that a particle
always has a definite position between measurements. There is no
superposition of properties and “measurement” (or observation) is
an attempt to discover this position.52
We agree that Bohm’s 1952 treatment of the measurement process is beau-
tiful, as is his 1951 treatment. Both effectively attempt to show that not every
interpretation of quantum mechanics needs to introduce the term “measure-
ment” as a primitive. Although we are doubtful as to whether Bohm in 1952
intentionally addressed the “measurement problem” in its standard sense, we
agree with the claim that since there is no collapse of the wavefunction in the de
Broglie-Bohm theory, there is no measurement problem. But we disagree with
the final two sentences in this quote.
For in these sentences, Cushing enshrines the hypothetical corpuscle (or its
“definite position”) as the foundation of the “basic idea” of measurement. In
our view, the existence of such an entity does not mean there is no superposition
of properties. This superposition is a fact, and Everett’s greatest legacy is to
have suggested that appearances can be saved despite it. Indeed we have tried
to argue that observation—in so far as this is related to the cognitive process
of “knowing” the outcome of the measurement process—is not discovering the
position of the de Broglie-Bohm corpuscle even if it exists.
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